Motivated by a characteristic way in which firms in developed countries make their decisions regarding cooperation with potential partners from less developed countries, we design a simple model of a DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two parties. Matched firms can "start small" with a trial order or pilot project of variable size in order to gain information about the ability of the LDC firm to successfully carry out a large project. We derive results relating whether and how the parties start small to the characteristics of the large project and to the matching environment. Among other results, we show how risk and search cost are associated with the propensity to start small and we establish a connection between starting small and the expected longevity of successful partnerships. We also address methods of contract enforcement and demonstrate the relationship between starting small and monitoring.
I. Introduction
Partnerships often begin in a state of uncertainty, where there is some doubt about the prospect of success. In such an environment, the partners may "start small" by first attempting small-scale projects and then, if they are successful, graduating to larger ones. In this way, the parties structure their relationship in order to learn about one another before committing a great deal of resources to the enterprise. When deciding how to interact, partners also consider the chance that they will eventually terminate their relationship. The value of termination depends on how easily other matches can be made and on the information available about prospective new partners.
We design a simple model to explore the interaction between how ongoing relationships are structured and the process by which they are formed. The basic, decision-theoretic analysis combines the problem of investment under uncertainty with the problem of optimal search. An extension of the model incorporates the strategic issue of contract enforcement. We study the relationship between parameters of the matching environment (such as the cost of search) and the extent to which partners start small. We also examine complementarities between various endogenous features of partnerships, including the extent of starting small, longevity of partnerships, and methods of contract enforcement. The main goal of our theoretical exercise is to capture, with the simplest possible model, a variety of realistic features of the formation and structure of long-term relationships. We hope this will encourage empirical research on the dynamic structure of partnerships. Development of our model was motivated by our desire to understand a characteristic way in which developed country (DC) firms make their decisions regarding cooperation with a potential less developed country (LDC) partner. Egan and Mody (1992) surveyed United States buyers operating in LDCs, including "manufacturers, retailers, importers, buyers' agents, and joint venture partners" (p. 322), and found that "buyers often begin with small orders, perhaps for a simple product, and let the relationship [with the LDC firm] build gradually" (p. 330). The purpose of the small order is to learn about the capabilities of the LDC firm's manager and workers to meet the DC firm's requirements for price, quality, and delivery. Egan and Mody state (p. 326):
Buyers looking for either new sources of supply or joint venture partners search for suppliers who manage their factories efficiently, often regardless of the level of technology those factories currently employ; interviewees commonly felt that new machines could easily be installed so long as workers already had the ability to use them efficiently and absorb training readily. For many buyers, management was the most important factor in defining an ideal supplier....As one buyer phrased it, "I do not invest in plant X but in Mr. Y. It all depends on the people."
We model the DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two parties. Matched firms can "start small" in our model.
Clearly one is more likely to learn Mr. Y's true type, as it were, the more the initial order resembles the product(s) that the DC firm ultimately wants to buy in large quantity. Hence the DC firm learns more, the more assistance it provides such as visits to the supplier's plant by engineers or other technical staff. In our analysis we therefore not only allow the DC firm to choose whether or not to start small but also to choose the intensity with which it starts small. 1 We assume that only one large project is available and therefore do not attempt to explain the choice between different types of large project. To some extent this choice is determined by the DC firm's characteristics, e.g., whether it is a retailer or a manufacturer.
If the small order is filled to the DC firm's satisfaction, it moves on to a large project in partnership with the LDC firm. In practice this ranges anywhere from a large order and finance for working capital to fulfill it up to a joint venture in building a more modern plant with larger capacity.
1 Clearly starting small involves not only direct cost but also delay relative to doing the large project immediately. It can only be understood as a way of avoiding the loss of a large investment in the event that the LDC firm turns out to be incapable of producing at levels of price, quality, and delivery that yield profit to the DC firm. For this reason we will regard the DC firm's investment as irreversible (a sunk cost) in our analysis.
We show that the intensity with which the DC firm starts small is increasing in the probability that the large project will be successful, increasing in the profitability of the large project, and decreasing in the investment the large project requires. We also show that the more risky is the large project, the more likely is the DC firm to start small.
The risk of a failed partnership is not the only reason a DC firm might want to start small.
The high cost of finding another partner might be a factor as well: otherwise, if the odds for success do not look good enough, why not just find another partner? Hence we speak of an "unfamiliar" rather than an "uncertain" environment: it is not just the riskiness of investment in LDC partners but also the high cost of search in LDCs that may favor starting small. The cost of search is therefore a key parameter in our analysis, and we confirm that starting small is more likely when search costs are high. 2 Egan and Mody cite Vernon-Wortzel, Wortzel, and Deng (1988) in explaining that "some suppliers, especially those trying to penetrate a new market, promise quantities, delivery dates, or prices which they cannot achieve, and then are surprised at the buyer's angry reaction." Since in our model uncertainty of the DC firm regarding its investment is resolved in an ongoing relationship with its partner, a new supplier (e.g., from another LDC) is placed at a disadvantage relative to the existing supplier even if the initial investment of the DC firm has been fully depreciated and must be renewed. In other words, the fact that the DC firm does not know the "type" of the new supplier but has learned that its current supplier is the "good" type (otherwise it would have found another one) makes it more difficult for the former to break into the DC market. On the basis of their aforementioned survey, Egan and Mody (1992, p. 329) report that "U.S. buyers prefer to stay with suppliers they know....Buyers commonly report taking on new suppliers only when they foresee increased sales beyond current suppliers' capacity or when existing suppliers cannot meet changing quality or price requirements....the number of 'windows of opportunity' for new supplier firms may be limited." We derive results on the persistence of relationships between DC firms and their partners. Given certain restrictions we are able to show that, conditional on a successful large project, the expected longevity of a partnership that started small is at least as great as the expected longevity of a partnership that started big.
In addition to the problem of finding a high-quality LDC firm with which to establish a partnership, DC firms may be concerned with motivating LDC partners to perform over time. In other words, contracts specifying effort on the part of the LDC firms must be enforced. As Egan and Mody (1992, p. 326) put it, DC firms find it important that LDC partners "do what they say they will do."
2 Enforcement is particularly challenging in the setting of DC-LDC partnerships, 3 Egan and Mody (1992) further point out the value of frequent contact and reliable communication technologies. 4 Dixit and Pindyck (1995, p. 111 ) provide a numerical example where a firm can invest in R&D to reveal information rather than rely on the passage of time.
since international and LDC legal institutions are not as powerful or developed as those within
DCs.
An extension of our model allows us to address the roles of three common enforcement institutions: direct enforcement (monitoring), self-enforcement, and community enforcement. We highlight the role of monitoring, which is especially important and visible in practice. For example, Rhee et al. (1984, p. 62 ) state of Korean exporters of manufactures that, "Because of the activities of foreign buyers in supervising and checking export shipments, the exporting firms had a strong motive to implement effective methods of quality control."
3 We demonstrate theoretically how the level of monitoring depends on the LDC firms' prospects for establishing relationships with new DC partners. These prospects are influenced by matching friction, the extent of community enforcement, and the degree of caution exercised by DC firms at the beginning of relationships. We emphasize the inverse relation between starting small and monitoring.
Our model is related to two strands of the literature. The main, decision-theoretic, component of our analysis is most clearly related to the literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty (e.g., Dixit and Pindyck 1994) . Unlike this literature, our analysis embeds the investing firm's decision within a search problem, and information is revealed by "starting small" rather than by the passage of time. 4 Closer in spirit to our model is Horstmann and Markusen (1996) , who analyze the choice by a multinational firm seeking to enter a new (foreign) market 5 Our model identifies starting small as a response to uncertainty. The literature contains some complementary work in which starting small arises due to asymmetric information. For example, Watson (1996) studies a model of partnerships in which agents are uncertain about each others' incentives. He shows that it is optimal to start small and gradually raise the stakes in such an environment. In the present context, possibilities for opportunistic behavior on the part of an LDC partner are greatly reduced by the monitoring to which it is routinely subjected by the DC firm.
between direct investment and contracting with a local sales agent. Information gained from the agency contract is useful in the decision whether to pursue direct investment, hence the agency contract is analogous to "starting small" (though unlike starting small in that it may be desirable to extend it indefinitely). Again, the firm's decision is not embedded within a search problem in that it cannot search over potential agents. Within the search literature, the closest model appears to be that of Jovanovic (1979) since he allows the searching worker to learn about the quality of his match with a firm over time rather than having to decide immediately whether to match for life or look for another firm. Again information is revealed only by the passage of time, so a fortiori the worker cannot vary the intensity of the "investment" in learning he is making (by staying with the present firm) at any point in time. To allow our model to handle these complications we simplify greatly (relative to, say, Dixit and Pyndyck 1994) the modeling of time (discrete rather than continuous) and of uncertainty (the outcome of the large project is permitted to take only two values). We feel that little is lost thereby for our purposes because we do not want to develop decision-making guidelines such as hurdle rates or optimal stopping rules.
The second strand of the literature relevant for our theoretical exercise is that which analyzes incentives for ongoing cooperation when severance leads to random rematching.
Examples include Ramey and Watson's (1996) model of contracting and ownership, Datta (1996) , and Ghosh and Ray (1996) . Also worth noting is Watson's (1999a,b) analysis of starting small in settings of incomplete information. We discuss these and other papers below.
The next section of this paper presents the assumptions and notation of our model and establishes the existence of a unique solution. Sections III, IV, and V derive our results. Of these, the latter two sections consider extensions of the basic model to address search during a productive relationship and contract enforcement, respectively. Conclusions and suggestions for further research are presented in Section VI. The Appendix contains all of the formal proofs.
II. The model

A. Assumptions and notation
We can outline the problem of the DC firm as follows. It searches in discrete time over a large (infinite) pool of LDC firms for a partner in a large project. In a given period it locates a potential partner at cost γ , with whom it can interact in succeeding periods. The DC firm then has three choices:
(1) Invest in the large project immediately (Big);
(2) Run a small pilot project that may provide information on the chance of success of the large project (Learn); and (3) Reject the partner and return to searching (Out).
We assume that the small project may be undertaken with intensity rM [0,1], at cost c(r). With probability r the nature (success or failure) of the large project is revealed at the end of the period, 6 We could relax this assumption by, for example, allowing the investment in the small project to reduce the investment required for the large project on a less than one-for-one basis without qualitatively changing any of our results. and with probability 1 -r no information regarding the large project is revealed. For simplicity the small project is assumed to have no yield other than this information. 6 To describe the problem formally we introduce the following notation. Each partner drawn from the pool is described by a tuple (π,p,I,c), with the following interpretation. The value π is the total discounted sum of DC firm profit if the large project is successful; that is, successful large project pays (1 - u L denotes the expected value of starting small with the current partner.
7 A comment is in order regarding why the outcome "No news" leads to the choice "Learn (again)": if the small project yields no information in period t, the DC firm is in the same situation in period t+1 and therefore makes the same choice: to start small. 
B. Solution
To solve our model we start by characterizing the optimal course of action for a generic partner selected from the pool, with w fixed. We then complete the solution by endogenizing w.
Given our description of the DC firm's problem, our notation, and Figure 1 , it is clear that
Note that u depends on (π,p,I,c) and the value w.
In section III below we establish that there exists a set of potential partners of nonzero measure for which it is optimal to choose Learn over Big and Out. For those partners for which
Learn is best, we can at this point determine the optimal intensity r of the effort made to learn whether or not the large project will succeed. Fixing (π,p,I,c), let
defines u L and r*, the optimal choice of r. The assumptions on c guarantee that the maximum exists and is characterized by the first-order condition, which is A - The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that the cost of learning nothing is further delay in pursuing the opportunity at hand. The more valuable the opportunity, the more costly the delay, and hence the more effort it is worth spending to learn enough to decide now rather than later. The condition π -I > w also insures that it is not optimal to search for another (better) partner while a successful large project is in place, implemented and producing profit. In subsection B we consider the case when new partners can be located without costly search. 9 Our argument is obvious if π , p, and I are independently distributed. With the appropriate definition of first-order stochastic dominance, the result extends to correlated distributions. 10 Convexity of u L follows directly from the comparative statics of r* and inequalities (2) -(4).
In the event that π -I < w, the optimal decision is obviously Out. is too high, it is optimal to return to the pool; and if the values of π and p are too high and the value of I is too low it is optimal to start the large project immediately. We need to show that values for which starting small is optimal do in fact exist. 
we can make u L (w*) arbitrarily close to A(w*) by choosing c(r) appropriately (i.e., so that r* close to one is chosen at very low cost). We have thus shown that we can create a partner for which
Learn is preferred to Big and Out. We then let σ k be the distribution that puts all mass on that partner. The final step addresses that w* changes because the pool of potential partners is changing.
We now want to establish that the higher the risk of a potential partnership, the more likely is the DC firm to start small. Clearly a more risky partnership is one with lower probability of success of the large project and a higher required investment, keeping the expected return to the large project constant. We will interpret the latter clause to mean increasing π so that u B remains constant when p falls and I increases. We can then prove the following proposition, establishing that a more risky partner favors Learn over Big:
Proposition 4: Given a fixed pool, consider two potential partners described by (π,p,I,c) and (πk,pk,Ik,c) where pk < p, Ik > I, and u
It follows that having the option to start small increases the value of a more risky pool to the DC firm, in a sense we will now make precise. Fix a common cost function c(r) in the population and take a distribution Next we establish that the DC firm is more likely to start small in an environment that is more unfamiliar in the sense that search costs are higher. To see the intuition behind this result, observe that a higher search cost implies a smaller value of w*. Also note that part of the cost of waiting to learn about an LDC firm's type is the delay in returning to search in the event that the project is unsuccessful. This cost of delay is proportional to w*. Thus, when the outside opportunity for DC firms is reduced, it lowers the value of starting big, relative to the value of starting small.
IV. Persistence of Partnerships With Random Arrival of New Opportunities
Once a DC firm enters into a partnership with an LDC supplier it may gain access to an information network composed of firms engaged in similar partnerships. Egan and Mody (1992, p. 329) report that "virtually all buyers first seek information within their own network. This network is a tight system of product-specific buyers and suppliers of both finished goods and components." Through this network, new potential LDC suppliers may come to the DC firm's attention without the latter having to engage in costly search.
As discussed in the Introduction, exogenous market changes may cause "windows of opportunity" to open that allow new LDC partners to replace existing ones. We model this simply by assuming that large projects require the investment I every n periods, rather than assuming that I lasts indefinitely as before, and that DC firms cannot change partners except when I needs to be renewed, so that a "window of opportunity" arises every n periods. We thus append our model so that if t is the period in which the most recent investment was made, with probability q the DC firm obtains information about another potential partner between periods t+1 and t+n, on which it can act in period t+n. In the event that information is obtained, the DC firm can choose whether to continue with the current partner (discarding the new opportunity) or abandon the current project and join with the new partner. If no information is obtained, the DC firm obviously stays with the current partner. Assume that starting small is not an option with the new 11 The option of starting small can be included, but only at the cost of less transparent analysis.
12 In order to keep 
partner. 11 Thus, the relevant information about the new partner is summarized by some profile (πk,pk,Ik). 12 Notice that the DC firm does not know whether the new large project will be successful when deciding whether to take the opportunity. If it abandons the current project in favor of a new one that is unsuccessful, then the DC firm must return to the pool to search for yet another partner (with which it has the option to start small).
Let v(π,I) be the value of running the big project, starting from an investment period, conditional on the project known to be successful. It can easily be shown that the value of investing and running the project for n periods is (π-I)(1-δ n ). We can then see that v(π,I) is implicitly defined by the equation where the expectation is taken over the pool of potential partners. Note that w is a parameter in the function v; therefore, we will use the notation v(π,I;w).
To complete the model, we need to show that v is well-defined. Then we must show that the endogenously defined w exists as well. Using standard techniques in recursive analysis (see, for example, Stokey and Lucas (1989)) we find that the functional mapping defined by equation (5) That is, a partner from this set is given by (π(α),p(α),I(α)). Second, the value of starting big is the same for each of these partners. Suppose that π (α) is increasing, p(α) is decreasing, and I(α) is 13 While it is tempting to attribute this greater expected longevity of partnerships that started small to greater relationship-specific investment than in partnerships that started big, this is only true insofar as the investment c(r) in information is associated with a riskier project. 
V. Strategic Consideration: Contract Enforcement
To this point, we have taken a simple decision-theoretic approach to analyzing partnership dynamics. Now we shall address some strategic issues by extending our model to incorporate an incentive problem. Suppose a successful large project requires ongoing effort on the part of the LDC firm. In order to produce, the firms must find a way to enforce a contract specifying that the LDC firm will exert the appropriate amount of effort over time. We explore how the firms deal 14 Assume, for simplicity, that the LDC firm does not make an effort choice when Learn is chosen in a period. Further, the LDC firm obtains zero except during production of a successful large project.
with the moral hazard problem and, in particular, how the method of contract enforcement relates to whether the firms start small in their relationship.
There are several enforcement institutions to consider. Under self-enforcement, the firms agree that continued cooperation is contingent on effort by the LDC firm in the past. With this expectation, the LDC firm may be motivated to expend effort, foregoing short-term gains from shirking, in order to preserve the valuable relationship. A community enforcement scheme features the same trade-off, but it includes punishment by third parties. In this case, news of misbehavior by the LDC firm will be disseminated to other firms (such as its prospective future DC partners) who contribute to the punishment. Finally, direct external enforcement refers to a legal institution or commitment technology that enforces contracts written by the LDC and DC partners. For example, increased monitoring of LDC firm activities can reduce discretion and the scope for opportunism.
We shall keep our model simple by adopting the minimal extensions necessary to address contract enforcement. We add to the basic model defined in Section II. Suppose that, once the firms undertake a successful large project, the LDC firm must privately select an effort level each period. Effort in a period can be either High or Low. High effort in a period yields the output π (1-δ) to the DC firm in the period, as in the basic model. High effort also generates b(1-δ) to the LDC firm in each period.
14 On the other hand, low effort generates a private return of x to the LDC firm in the current period. It also yields a return to the DC firm that we assume is small enough so that the DC firm would never wish to produce under low effort. In addition, low effort 16 In practice, monitoring also helps the LDC firm obtain information about the trustworthiness of the DC firm. We have modeled the information role only through the starting small decision. See Watson (1999a,b) for an analysis of learning in an incomplete information environment. 17 Here we are abstracting away from studying any trade-off between monitoring and the sentry's compensation. This allows us to avoid studying how monitoring costs feedback to the returns of the DC firm. A more complete model of contracting and the sentry's incentives does not alter the qualitative results on monitoring and starting small which we address in this section. The broader approach leads to some messy technical issues regarding existence of equilibrium, which we are able to avoid by taking the more abstract route. destroys the value of continuing the relationship and thus causes the relationship to sever. 15 When the relationship is severed, the DC firm obtains w in the following period, as in the basic model.
The severance value for the LDC firm, from the start of the next period, is denoted z.
To understand whether high effort can be enforced, consider the incentives of the LDC firm in a given period during implementation of the large project. If it always expends high effort, the LDC firm obtains the value b, which is the discounted sum of returns. If it expends low effort, it obtains x + δ z. Thus, high effort can be sustained if and only if b
We call this the effort constraint.
The value x depends on how much the DC firm monitors the LDC firm. By monitoring the LDC firm, the DC firm can reduce the gains from behaving opportunistically. Thus, monitoring is a form of direct contract enforcement. 16 We suppose monitoring is done by a sentry, who is employed by the DC firm. To keep the analysis simple, we assume the sentry's compensation is fixed and does not depend on the amount of time he spends monitoring the LDC firm. Under threat of punishment by the DC firm, the sentry monitors just enough to ensure high effort. 17 Letting µ denote the resources spent monitoring the LDC firm in a given period, we 18 This could be relaxed somewhat, but some correlation between characteristics when matched with different firms is required for our results. 
Observe that m is increasing. We assume this function is the same for all DC-LDC relationships.
The DC firm's problem and the determination of w* is exactly as analyzed in Section II.
To complete the analysis in this expanded setting, we must describe the endogenous parameter z and determine its value in equilibrium. This requires us to be more explicit about the prospects for a given LDC firm, in particular one that is not matched with a DC partner. We suppose that the pool of LDC firms is divided between those who are currently matched and those waiting to make a match. An LDC firm obtains zero when unmatched. If a relationship between an LDC and a DC firm is terminated in a period, the LDC firm returns to the unmatched pool in the following period and awaits another match. After separation, the DC firm behaves as analyzed in Section II.
We make the following assumptions concerning LDC characteristics. First, the characteristics (π,p,I,c) of an LDC firm are independent of the DC firm with which it is matched.
Second, whether the large project is successful is redrawn with each new DC firm faced. Under these assumptions, different DC firms would behave the same way toward an individual LDC firm. 18 Finally, we assume that an unmatched LDC firm is matched with a DC suitor in a given 19 To be complete, we should provide conditions under which the matching market is active and the populations stable over time. By including random exogenous separation, this can be done without much difficulty. period with probability s. This number reflects the state of the matching market (frictions and relative numbers of DC and LDC firms) as well as the extent of community enforcement, as discussed below.
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In our matching environment, z solves The model yields immediate results regarding the method of contract enforcement.
Solving (6) for z, we have z = Fb, where
One can easily verify that 20 Our result is related to the findings of Ghosh and Ray (1996) . They demonstrate that starting small may arise under incomplete information and that this helps discipline players in long-term relationships. Watson (1999a,b) provides the most complete study of the dynamics of cooperation under incomplete information. Datta (1996) and Kranton (1996) also discuss how starting small can serve a disciplining role in games. Carmichael and MacLeod (1997) demonstrate how a social convention requiring the exchange of gifts at the beginning of relationships can help sustain cooperation. Our work is distinguished by the breadth of enforcement devices studied, in particular monitoring and difficulty finding a new partner. In addition, we emphasize starting small as a response to joint uncertainty, rather than asymmetric information.
Proposition 7:
In every DC-LDC relationship, the amount of monitoring, µ, is directly related to the LDC matching probability, s, and inversely related to the degree of caution exercised by the DC firm, 1/φ.
The proposition provides a simple basis for understanding how contracts are enforced in our theoretical setting. Note that LDC firms are disciplined by both monitoring and the threat of severance. Monitoring is only needed to the extent that severance is not very costly to an LDC firm. Thus, to determine how much monitoring will take place, we simply ascertain the LDC firm's value of severance.
We wish to emphasize how the value of severance relates to the degree of caution exercised by DC firms, which further implies a relation between monitoring and starting small. To generate intuition for this part of Proposition 7, note that, when an LDC firm's characteristics render it a risky partner, DC firms will prefer to start small with it. But starting small is an exercise of caution, which entails delay (φ < 1). This caution lowers the LDC firm's value of starting a new relationship. As a result, its gains from cheating are reduced, which lowers the amount of monitoring necessary to induce effort. 20 21 Kandori (1992) and Greif (1993) , among others, have studied community enforcement.
The need for monitoring is also reduced when s is small. There are two reasons why this may be the case in reality. First, the LDC firm side of the matching market may be very long, meaning there are more LDC firms than DC firms looking for partners. In this case, LDC firms have to wait a substantial amount of time before being matched, if at all. Second, a small value of s may reflect the use of coordinated community sanctions. If an LDC firm behaves opportunistically, its DC partner disseminates the news to other DC firms who may be prospective new partners for the LDC firm. Under the expectation that the LDC firm will exert low effort in future relationships, other DC firms would be unwilling to initiate a partnership with this firm. As a result, s decreases for LDC firms that have misbehaved.
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In general, community sanctions are likely to be effective when DC firms communicate regularly and share information about the performance of LDC firms. Strong network ties, which are often maintained in reality, can facilitate the required communication. Intermediaries can also play an important role in this regard. Egan and Mody (1992, p. 330) verify the practice of community enforcement and the existence of networks. They write:
Although buyers typically do not tell other buyers of particular deals with suppliers, they often will discuss the suppliers' qualifications, demands, and past performance. Willingness to supply accurate supplier references is a part of the mutual obligations within the industry network.
Our analysis in this section is intended to be quite simplistic, allowing us to generate useful intuition on strategic issues without additional theoretical complexity. As a result, we have left out some features of relationships that are obviously important as well, and we have not touched on several other theoretical issues. For example, it would be instructive to perform a 22 This is especially true when the aim of the partners is to generate exports to DC markets. Gereffi (1995) notes that LDC firms participate in exports of "branded" products to DCs in four different ways: export-processing (or in-bond) assembly, component-supply subcontracting, original equipment manufacturing, and original brand-name manufacturing. Only the last of these does not necessarily involve participation by DC firms, and is the exception rather than the rule. fuller analysis of the matching process and to consider more sophisticated contracting. In addition, we have not modelled contract negotiation between the LDC and DC firms, nor between the DC firms and their sentries. For related work addressing matching and contract negotiation, see Watson (1996), de Marzo and Lockwood (1998) , and den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (1999) .
VI. Implications and Suggestions for Further Research
In this paper we studied a characteristic way in which DC buying firms build partnerships with LDC suppliers. We focused on the role that an unfamiliar environment plays in inducing the DC firms to "start small" in their relationships with LDC partners, on the persistence of these relationships in the face of opportunities for the DC firms to form new partnerships, and on the method used to motivate the effort of LDC firms. Better understanding of the decisions made by DC firms regarding cooperation with LDC firms is important because, among other things, this cooperation is a major source of technology transfer from DCs to LDCs. 22 Even when the DC firm is a buyer but not an equity partner (is not involved in a joint venture with the LDC firm), as is typically the case when the DC firm is a retailer rather than a manufacturer, significant technology transfer takes place. 23 From the point of view of these DC firms, Pack and Page (1994, pp. 220-221) note that
The motivation of the purchasers is to obtain still lower-cost, better quality products from major suppliers whose products account for a significant percentage of profits. To achieve this they are willing to transmit tacit and occasionally proprietary knowledge from their other OECD suppliers. Such transfers of knowledge are likely to characterize simpler production sectors such as clothing and footwear or more generally those older technologies that are not hedged by restrictions adopted to increase appropriability, such as patents and trade secrets.
This source of technology transfer has grown in importance in the last two to three decades as the amount of manufacturing in LDCs for markets in DCs has increased dramatically.
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Regarding technology transfer, ours is a strictly partial equilibrium model. If the matching process we describe does indeed entail considerable transfer of technological know-how from the DC firms to their LDC partners, its aggregate effect on productivity and incomes in the host country, and the feedback to search and investment decisions by the DC firms, are interesting subjects for future research. 25 The expression for j u L /jw is found using the envelope theorem.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We saw that we can rewrite equation (1) 
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We show in the text that, given w*, we can find characteristics for which Learn is strictly preferred to Big and Out. Let 
